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CRIMINAL LAW-People v. Hickman-Defining
the Felon's Accountability Under the Felony Murder
Rule
The felony murder rule states that a homicide "committed in the
course . . .of a felony is murder on the theory that the element of
malice may be implied from the fact of the commission of the felony,
even though the killing is unintentional and accidental."' Its purpose is to deter dangerous unlawful acts and felonies,2 but it also
simplifies the task of prosecution since proof of commission of a
felony satisfies the need for proof of mental state.
Early English versions of the rule were broad in scope. Coke's
formulation encompassed all deaths resulting from illegal acts:
"[i]f the act be unlawfull, it is murder." 3 Blackstone's statement
of the doctrine limited its use to felonious acts: "if one intends to
do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is murder." 4
These broad formulations were gradually narrowed in England, as
well as in the United States. For example, in many states a felon is
liable for accidental homicide only if it occurs during the commission of a felony which is dangerous to life. 5 Although still prevalent
in the United States, the felony murder rule was abolished in England in 1957.6
FELONY MURDER IN ILLINOIS

The felony murder doctrine was codified in Illinois in 1827. It
specified that a killing which occurred in the commission of an
unlawful act was murder if its consequences naturally tended to
destroy life or if it was done with felonious intent.' The Criminal
1. R. ANDERSON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 539 (1957).
2. Morris, The Felon's Responsibilities for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
50 (1956).
3. E. COKE. THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1670).
4. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *200-01.
5. For a discussion of the limitations placed on the felony murder rule, see W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTr. HAND3OOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 546 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]; R.
PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 40-41, 44 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS]; MODEL PENAL
CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL
CODE].

6.
7.

English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1.
Law of January 6, 1827, ILL. REV. LAWS § 28 (1827), which reads:
Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being, without any
intent so to do, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act, which
probably [might] produce such a consequence, in an unlawful manner: Provided
always, That where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an
unlawful act, which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a
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Code of 1961 modified the rule's formulation by limiting is application to forcible felonies:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than
voluntary manslaughter.'
A forcible felony is defined as
treason, murder

. . .

rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping,

aggravated battery and any other felony which involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence.'
Liability for the acts of a felon who kills is imposed upon his
confederates by a two-step process. The killer himself is guilty of
murder under the provisions of the felony murder statute;° his accomplices are held responsible under the accountability statute for
the acts committed by the principal in furtherance of the common
design of the felony."
The most controversial application of the doctrine is to a felon
charged with murder when the homicide is committed by a nonfelon
acting in opposition to the felony. 2 Proponents of a restrictive interpretation of the rule espouse the agency theory of homicide liability,
which holds that the fatal act must be that of the defendant or his
accomplice. 3 Others advocate a proximate cause theory of liability,
in which the felon is liable for the lethal acts of a resister to the
felony, if the felon's conduct is the proximate cause of the retaliatory force." In the recent case of People v. Hickman,5 the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the proximate cause theory and held partichuman being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offences
shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder.
The wording remained virtually unchanged through 1959. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 363 (1959).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1973).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1973).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1973).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 5-1, 5-2 (1973).
12. This article is limited to an analysis of the proper scope of the felony murder doctrine,
and takes no position on the merits of retention or abolition of the rule itself. The many
available sources of information on the debate over the latter issue, both in Illinois and in
other states, include: LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 545-61; PERKINS, supra note 5, at 3745; R. ANDERSON, I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE at 539-49 (1957); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 201.2, supra note 5, at 33-39; Comment, Felony Murder in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L. F.
685.
13. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) for a discussion of
the agency theory as it applies to the felony murder rule.
14. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
924 (1950), for a discussion of the proximate cause theory in criminal law.
15. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
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ipants in a felony responsible for the death of a policeman shot
accidently by another police officer who was resisting the felony.
PEOPLE V. HICKMAN

Seventeen Joliet policemen were engaged in a surveillance of a
liquor warehouse on the night of April 2, 1970. Late that evening,
the officers observed an automobile stopping at the side of the building. Several persons left the automobile, entered the warehouse, and
exited from the building a few minutes later. Police then approached the men, Robert Papes, Glenn Hickman, and Anthony
Rock. Papes, who was armed, fled in one direction and was soon
apprehended by police. Hickman and Rock ran in another direction
toward some bushes.
While Hickman and Rock were fleeing, Sergeant James Cronk,
one of the police officers participating in the surveillance, saw two
people running in the same direction as the burglars. After his commands to halt were ignored, he briefly lost sight of them. Seconds
later he saw a man carrying a handgun running in the same direction. Believing this man to be one of the burglars, he ordered him
to drop his gun. When the man failed to comply, Cronk shot and
killed him. The victim was Detective William Loscheider of the
Joliet police force.
Hickman and Rock, who were arrested approximately one hour
after the shooting, were found guilty of murder, burglary, and criminal damage to property in Will County Circuit Court. Papes was
charged with and convicted of the latter two crimes only. The trial
court entered an order arresting the judgment of murder against
Hickman and Rock on the ground that the felony murder doctrine
cannot support a conviction of murder when a police officer, in
pursuit of a felon, kills a fellow police officer. The State appealed
the arrest of judgment order and the appellate court reversed.' 6 On
appeal to the supreme court, defendants argued that in order to
sustain a felony murder conviction the killing must be done by one
of the felons in furtherance of the forcible felony.
Chief Justice Underwood, writing for the court in People v.
Hickman, affirmed the appellate court decision, holding that Hickman and Rock ". . . were directly responsible for the death of Detective Loscheider and guilty of his murder."' 7 Ruling that a felon is
responsible for lethal acts of a nonfelon done in opposition to the
felony, the court noted:
16. 12 I1. App. 3d 412, 297 N.E.2d 582, (1973), rev'd, 59 Ill.
2d 511 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 913 (1975).
17. 59 Il1. 2d at 95, 319 N.E.2d at 514.
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The shot which killed Detective Loscheider was a shot fired in
opposition to the escape of the fleeing burglars, and it was a direct
and foreseeable consequence of defendants' actions. The escape
. . . invited retaliation, opposition and pursuit. Those who commit forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to
their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape. As we
indicated in a recent felony-murder case, 'It is unimportant that
the defendant did not anticipate the precise sequence of events
. . . . His unlawful acts precipitated those events, and he is responsible for the consequences." '

Hickman therefore increases the liability of a felon for unintended
homicides at a time when most states are restrictively construing
the scope of the doctrine. 9 However, the decision does not analyze
the responsibility of a felon for the acts of an intervening agent when
the homicide victim is a cofelon, rather than an innocent party as
in Hickman. Additionally, Hickman tests the constitutional limits
of a criminal's liability for acts committed by someone other than
an accomplice.
THE PENNSYLVANIA DECISIONS

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treatment of the scope of the
felony murder rule is enlightening because it has struggled with the
full range of problems which have and will confront Illinois.
Commonwealth v. Almeida 0 involved a robbery in which a police
officer was killed by a bullet which may have been fired by another
policeman. Basing its decision on the proximate cause theory of
18. Id. at 94, 319 N.E.2d at 513 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
19. The felony murder doctrine is currently held in disfavor in many jurisdictions, resulting in restrictive application. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 44. For a summary of the most
common limitations placed on the rule, see MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 201.2 at 37.
In addition, the majority of jurisdictions whose highest courts have considered the issue
do not hold a felon responsible for the lethal acts of resisters to the felony. Although it is
difficult to state the rule definitively in all jurisdictions due to variations between the factual
situations and judicial opinions from state to state, the following list clearly indicates the
trend. Those states that apply the agency theory to the felony murder rule are: Kentucky,
Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Massachusetts, Commonwealth
v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); Missouri, State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo.
1922); North Carolina, State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924); New York,
People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 736, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960); Nevada, Sheriff v.
Hicks, 506 P.2d 766 (Nev. 1973); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438
Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). California employs the agency theory, People v. Washington,
62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 (1965), but it also utilizes a vicarious liability
theory. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 49 through 54 infra. Michigan
holds the felon liable for the lethal acts of a resister when the victim is innocent, People v.
Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952), but not
when the victim is a cofelon, People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963). For a
discussion of the shield exception, see text accompanying notes 55 through 58 infra.
20. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
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criminal liability, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of
felony murder, even if a nonfelon fired the fatal shot since the killing
had its genesis in the robbery. The felon's liability was extended in
Commonwealth v. Thomas2 to include the death of a cofelon shot
by the intended victim of the robbery. The court reasoned that the
death of the cofelon was as readily foreseeable as the death of an
innocent third person.
The court overruled Thomas in Commonwealth v. Redline,2" holding that the Almeida rule does not apply when the homicide victim
is one of the cofelons. The court said that since the policeman's
killing of the cofelon in that case was justifiable, the murder charge
was insupportable. "How can anyone," the court asked, "no matter
how much of an outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged
against him for the consequences of the lawful conduct of another
person?"23
Finally, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers," the Pennsylvania court overruled Almeida, adopted the agency theory of criminal liability, and held that to sustain a felony murder charge the
killing must be done by the defendant or an accomplice acting in
furtherance of the felonious undertaking. The court rejected the
Redline reasoning, holding that:
to make the result hinge on the character of the victim is, in many
instances, to make it hinge on the marksmanship of resisters.25
THE FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS: WHEN THE
VICTIM IS AN INNOCENT PARTY

Early Illinois Law
The issue ultimately decided in Hickman was first considered in
5 Butler involved a fight between
Illinois in 1888 in Butler v. People."
defendants and a village marshall who was attempting to arrest
them for causing a minor disturbance. During the scuffle the marshall unintentionally shot and killed an innocent bystander. Citing
the lack of concert of action or a common design, the court refused
to find the defendants guilty of manslaughter.
It would be a strange rule of law, indeed, to hold a man liable for
a crime which he did not commit, which he did not advise, and
21.
22.
23.
24.
was an
25.
26.

382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
Id. at 509, 137 A.2d at 483.
438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). Smith, who was seeking a writ of habeus corpus,
accomplice of the defendant in the Almeida case.
Id. at 234, 261 A.2d at 558.
125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888).
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which was
committed without his knowledge or assent, express or
27
implied.
Although Butler did not involve a felony or an unlawful act likely
to result in death, its significance lies in its statement of principles:
No person can be held responsible for a homicide unless the act
was either actually or constructively committed by him; and, in
order to be his act, it must be committed by his hand, or by some
one acting in concert with him, or in furtherance of a common
design or purpose. Where the criminal liability arises from the act
of another, it must appear that the act was done in furtherance of
the common design, or in prosecution of the common purpose for
which the parties were assembled or combined together.
Erosion of the Butler doctrine originated in two cases arising from
the same factual situation, People v. Grant2l and People v.
Krauser. ° During an armed robbery attempt, defendants and a policeman engaged in a struggle that resulted in the officer's death.
Grant and Krauser argued that the policeman had killed himself
and, therefore, defendants could not be liable for murder. The court,
in each case, held that the evidence demonstrated that the act of
directing the gun, if not the actual pulling of the trigger, was committed by one of the defendants. The Krauser court distinguished
the facts before it from those of Butler, noting that in Butler the
death was not a natural consequence of defendant's actions.
Payne and Its Progeny
The agency theory of Butler was implicitly overruled in People v.
Payne.' In Payne, conspirators attempted to rob the residence of
two brothers. During the robbery, a gunfight erupted between the
robbers and one of the brothers. The second brother was killed, but
it was not known whether the fatal shot was fired by one of the
robbers or by the victim's brother. In affirming the murder conviction of one of the conspirators who was not present at the robbery,
the Illinois Supreme Court relied on language from Krauser:
It reasonably might be anticipated that an attempted robbery
would meet with resistance, during which the victim might be shot
either by himself or someone else in attempting to prevent the
27. Id. at 646, 18 N.E. at 340.
28. Id. at 645, 18 N.E. at 339.
29. 313 Ill. 69, 144 N.E. 813 (1924).
30. 315 Il1. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925). Krauser's conviction was reversed on evidentiary
grounds.
31. 359 Il. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
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robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery would be
guilty of murder 2
The drafters of the Criminal Code of 1961 specifically approved
the Payne rule by incorporating it in the committee comments:
It is immaterial whether the killing in such a case is intentional or
accidental, or is committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant . . . or even by a third person trying to
prevent the commission of the felony.3

This principle was applied by the appellate court in People v.
Danner,3 4 where a struggle between the defendant and the robbery
victim resulted in the victim's death from what may have been a
self-inflicted wound. In upholding the conviction, the court stated:
If the evidence establishes that defendant was attempting to commit a forcible felony and the victim's death was a result of that
attempt, it is immaterial who fired the particular shot which killed
the victim or whether the killing was intentional or accidental.3 5
In another recent case, People v. Smith," the victim awoke to find
a strange man standing in her apartment door. When he threatened
to kill her, she jumped out of a third floor window in an attempt to
save herself, and subsequently died from the fall. In affirming the
intruder's felony murder conviction, the court relied on Payne, holding that defendant could have anticipated the fatal result of his
conduct.
In People v. Allen, 37 decided only a few months before Hickman,
three men were thwarted in an attempt to rob an armored truck by
police who were surveilling the area of the planned crime. A gunfight initiated by the felons resulted in the death of a policeman,
but it was not clear who fired the fatal shot. Citing the foreseeability
language of Krauser and Payne and the committee comments to the
Criminal Code, the court stated:
We therefore hold that the defendant in this case may be held
liable for the death of Officer Singleton whether the fatal shot was
fired by a co-felon in the furtherance of the attempted robbery or
by another police officer in opposition to the attempted robbery. 3
32. Id. at 255, 194 N.E. at 543.
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1, Committee Comments at 9 (Smith Hurd 1972) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as § 9-1, Committee Comments].
34. 105 Ill. App. 2d 126, 245 N.E.2d 106 (1969).
35. Id. at 130, 245 N.E.2d at 108.
36. 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974).
37. 56 Il. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 865 (1974).
38. Id. at 545. 309 N.E.2d at 549.
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The Significance of Hickman
The court in People v. Hickman relied on the Payne decision and
the committee comments to the Criminal Code in determining that
defendants Hickman and Rock were responsible for the policeman's
death. At first glance, Hickman's effect on the scope of the felony
murder rule may seem a less dramatic departure from established
law due to its dependence on Payne, a case decided in 1935. Yet it
is significant for several reasons.
The Hickman court is the first Illinois court to confront the undisputed factual situation of an innocent person killing another innocent person in opposition to a felony. In Krauser, Payne, and Allen,
the court could not determine whether the felon or the innocent
party had fired the fatal shot; in Hickman it was certain that a
policeman killed a fellow officer. Critical examination of the felony
murder doctrine was required since the identity of the person firing
the fatal shot was undisputed. The court's reconsideration of the
proper scope of the rule resulted in a holding which firmly commits
Illinois to its expansion.
Furthermore, although the trend toward extension of the felony
murder doctrine has been evident since Payne, the court could have
readily distinguished all prior cases on other grounds and reversed
the defendants' convictions in Hickman. For example, in Krauser,
Payne, and Allen the felon either used or threatened to use his gun
first. Even in the Almeida0 and Thomas" cases, which marked the
furthest limits of the rule's extension in Pennsylvania, the defendants exchanged gunfire with their resisters. In Hickman, on the
other hand, the felons neither initiated nor engaged in a gunfight.
In addition, Danner and Krauser involved struggles between the
felon and the nonfelon which resulted in the death of the latter.
Since it mattered little who pulled the trigger if the felon caused the
gun to be pointed at the innocent party, the fatal acts that the
nonfelons may have committed could be freely imputed to the felon.
In Hickman, however, no struggle was involved. Finally, in Smith
the lethal act was entirely that of the victim, rather than that of the
resister, as in Hickman. Confronted with several alternatives to the
harsh reasoning of Payne, the Hickman court chose to broadly construe the scope of the felony murder rule in Illinois.
THE FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS: WHEN THE

VICTIM IS A COFELON

The supreme court in Hickman held a felon responsible for the
39.
40.

362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
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killing of an innocent party committed by a person acting in resistance to the felony. The court did not consider the question of a
felon's liability for an accomplice's death caused by a retaliatory
force, even though the appellate court in People v. Hickman had
raised that very issue in dictum. 4
The only early Illinois case dealing with this issue is People v.
Garippo.2 Garippo involved a manslaughter prosecution of a felon
for the death of a cofelon who was killed during a robbery, possibly
by the victim or by another nonfelon. In reversing the conviction,
the court held that the homicide was independent of the common
design of the robbery and not attributable to the defendants. The
court relied on the agency theory espoused in Butler, which holds
that the defendant is responsible only for the acts of himself and his
accomplices. However, Garippo's viability is uncertain since the
Hickman court adopted the proximate cause theory of criminal liability.
Shortly before Hickman was decided, the appellate court had
considered a felon's responsibility for his cofelon's death in People
v. Morris43 and People v. Hudson," cases arising from the same
factual situation. During an armed robbery, one of the victims resisted and killed one of the felons. The court refused to affirm the
murder convictions of cofelons Morris and Hudson, basing its refusal on Commonwealth v. Redline,4" which held that a killing of a
felon by a retaliatory force will not support a felony murder charge.
Morris was distinguished by the appellate court in Hickman on the
ground that the homicide victim in Hickman was an innocent party,
while the victim in Morris "assisted in setting in motion a chain of
events which was the proximate cause of his death."4
Thus, the supreme court has yet to hold that a felon is responsible
for the death of his cofelon. 7 Perhaps by affirming the appellate
court in Hickman, which distinguished the consequences of the
41. 12 I1. App. 3d 412, 417, 297 N.E.2d 582, 585-86 (1973).
42. 292 Ill.
293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920).
43. 1 111. App. 3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1971).
44. 6 I1. App. 3d 1062, 287 N.E.2d 41 (1972).
45. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
46. 12 Ill.
App. 3d at 417, 297 N.E.2d at 586.
47. The problem of the felon being charged with the murder of a cofelon who accidently
kills himself during the perpetration of the felony has never arisen in Illinois. People v. Ferlin,
203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928), and Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464
(1955), both involved a defendant who was charged with the murder of a hired arsonist who
accidently killed himself when he was carrying out the plan. The issue in such a case is
somewhat different than that in Hickman, since there is no retaliatory lethal force involved.
The failure of a court to convict in such a situation may be attributable to the court's
reluctance to afford the cofelon the protection of the criminal law.
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death of an innocent victim from that of a felon,48 the court has
indicated that it will adopt the Redline limitation when confronted
with this problem.
THE FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS: WHEN THE
PROSECUTION Is NOT BASED ON THE FELONY MURDER RULE

The CaliforniaApproach
A finding by a court that the felony murder rule does not apply
to acts performed by a nonfelon does not necessarily preclude a
defendant's conviction of murder for such acts. In a series of decisions the California Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant may
be vicariously liable for the lethal acts of a resister to the felony if
the defendant, in engaging in conduct that is likely to kill, acts with
a conscious disregard for human life.
The leading California case, People v. Washington,49 involved an
attempted robbery in which the robbery victim killed one of the
felons. The court refused to apply the felony murder statute to
convict defendant of his cofelon's murder, holding that the purpose
of the rule, to deter the felon from killing negligently, was not served
by punishing him for a killing committed by another person. However, without using the felony murder rule to imply malice, the
court set forth a ground upon which a defendant could be held
responsible for the acts of a nonfelon:
Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of
murder if their victims resist and kill. Under such circumstances,
"the defendant for a base, anti-social motive and with wanton
disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree
of probability that it will result in death." 50
In Taylor v. Superior Court,"'the court expanded the scope of its
vicarious liability theory by holding that acts less serious than initiating gunfire are sometimes sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to hold a defendant liable for a murder committed by a nonfeIon. During a robbery attempt, one of the felons repeatedly issued
death threats to the victims and the other felon exhibited an apprehensive and nervous composure. One of the robbery victims responded by shooting and killing one of the felons, which resulted in
48. 12 Ill.
App. 3d at 417, 297 N.E.2d at 585-86.
49. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). Accord, People v. Gilbert, 63
Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (review of the principles upon which a defendant may be convicted of a murder
committed by a third person).
50. 62 Cal. 2d at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
51. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
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the cofelon's conviction for murder. The court held that the felons,
in effect, had initiated the gunfire by their threatening conduct,
rendering the defendant vicariously responsible for the resister's act.
The California approach appears to be more a change in terminology than a significant departure from the broad construction of the
felony murder statute enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Hickman. That both the California and Illinois courts will imply
malice from a defendant's conduct and hold him liable for the acts
of another in certain instances suggests that results might not differ
significantly under the two systems. In People v. Allen,5" for example, the felon's initiation of gunfire could subject the defendants to
liability for murder under the California approach. In Hickman,
defendants' flight from police could be interpreted as conduct sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to support a murder conviction under the less exacting standards of Taylor. In discussing California's "rather new and unique theory of vicarious liability,"53 the
Nevada Supreme Court noted a trial judge's observation that a
"rose, the felony murder rule, is still a rose by any other name,
54
vicarious liability.

The Shield Exception
At least three jurisdictions impose liability on the felon for the
death of a victim when he is used as a shield or forced to occupy a
place of danger in order to aid in the felon's escape.55 The courts
reason that the defendant exhibits express malice by placing the
7 a person was
victim in danger." For example, in Wilson v. State,"
killed when he was forced to shield robbers during their escape. The
court ruled that the defendant's action in forcing the victim into a
perilous position was as much a cause of the victim's death as if
defendant himself had fired the fatal shot.
A "shield" case arising in Illinois would be governed by the felony
murder rule as interpreted in Hickman. However, there is no reason
to believe that prosecution could not be brought independently of
52. 56 Ill.
2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 865 (1974).
53. Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973).
54. Id. at 768 n.7.
55. Arkansas: Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934), Johnson v. State, 252
Ark. 1113, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972); New Jersey: State v. Kress, 105 N.J. Super. 514, 253 A.2d
481 (1969); Texas: Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900).
56. A New Jersey appellate court in State v. Kress, 105 N.J. Super. 514, 253 A.2d 481
(1969), based its decision on the felony murder rule, rather than on the express malice of the
defendant. In light of its heavy reliance on Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100
(1934), an express malice case, there appears to be little significance in its use of different
terminology.
57. 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934).
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the rule under section 9-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong possibility of
death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.5"
Therefore, the shield cases pose no problem in Illinois even if the
Hickman rule is rejected.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HICKMAN

A defendant convicted of felony murder under circumstances in
which neither he nor a confederate actually performed the killing
may challenge the Hickman interpretation of the felony murder
statute on constitutional grounds. The application of the United
States Constitution to this area of law is still unclear, but case law
indicates that the Hickman decision may violate defendants' rights
to due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.59
An analysis of this constitutional argument must focus first on the
court's interpretation of the felony murder statute, and then on the
question of whether that interpretation denies defendants due process of law by failing to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct.
The felony murder statute reads:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other
than voluntary manslaughter. 0
A reading of the statutory language leads one to the conclusion that
the "person who kills" or the person "performing the acts which
cause death" must be the same person who is "attempting or committing a forcible felony."
Since neither defendant in Hickman is the "person who kills" and
the defendants are held responsible for the policeman's conduct,
liability must be imposed by principles of criminal accountability.
But responsibility for the acts of another person arises only when the
conduct falls within the scope of the accountability statutes. Section 5-1 of the Criminal Code sets forth a broad rule of accountability:
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(2) (1973).
59. [Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1973).
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A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an
offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that
of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or both. 61
Section 5-2 provides:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(a) Having a mental state described by the statute defining
the offense, he causes another to perform the conduct, and
the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks
such a mental state; or

(b) The statute defining the offense makes him so accountable; or
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense,
and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission,
he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other
person in the planning or commission of the offense. 2
The defendants in Hickman may be held responsible for the acts of
the resister to the felony only if their conduct fits within section 52. Subsection (a) fails to define their conduct since it refers to the
"innocent agent" concept, where the defendant has induced a person lacking mental capacity to commit the act."3 Nor are the requirements of subsection (b) satisfied, since by the language of the
felony murder statute the "person who kills" must be the same
person who is "attempting or committing a forcible felony." Finally,
accountability is not established by subsection (c), since the
defendants did not solicit, aid, or abet the resister to the felony.
However, even if defendants could be held accountable by section
5-2, the requirement in the felony murder statute that the killing
must be done "without lawful justification" is not met. Since the
police officer who fired the fatal shot in Hickman apparently intended to prevent a person who committed a forcible felony from
defeating his arrest by escaping, the homicide was probably committed with lawful justification. 4
61.
62.
63.
64.

I.L.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 5-1 (1973).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (1973).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-1, Committee Comments at 286 (Smith Hurd 1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) defines when a policeman's use of force is justifiable:
A peace officer . . . is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably
believes to be necessary to effect the arrest . . . . However, he is justified in using
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he . . . reasonably
believes both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by
resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony
or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon.
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Only by resort to the committee comments, which lack the force
of law, may one conclude that the legislative intent is that the felony
murder statute applies even if the killing is committed by a "third
person trying to prevent the commission of the felony." 5 And while
a court may look to the comments to determine legislative intent,"
rules of statutory construction in Illinois require that statutes imposing severe punishment be construed restrictively.67 However, the
legislative intent evidenced in the comments is controverted by section 1-3 of the Criminal Code which states: "[no conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code or
in another statute of this State." 8 In the great majority of states
whose highest courts have considered this issue, the felony murder
statute has been interpreted not to extend to the lethal acts of
resisters to the felony. 9 This, along with the language of the felony
murder and accountability statutes, creates serious doubts as to the
correctness of the Hickman court's broad construction of the felony
murder statute.
The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of this contradictory
statutory scheme raises an issue of whether a person who plans a
forcible felony is adequately forewarned that his conduct may subject him to liability for a homicide committed by a resister to a
7 0 the United States
felony. In United States v. Harriss
Supreme
Court held that lack of definiteness in a criminal statute deprived
a person convicted under it of due process of law as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.7
The requirement of definiteness was again considered in Bouie v.
City of Columbia.7 2 While noting that the principle is usually applied to uncertainty resulting from vague or overbroad language in
a statute, the Court held that the potential deprivation of the right
65.
66.
67.
(1953).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

§ 9-1, Committee Comments, supra note 33, at 9.
People v. Touhy, 31 Ill. 2d 236, 201 N.E.2d 425 (1964).
People v. Hightower, 414 Ill. 537, 112 N.E.2d 126 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 875
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-3 (1973).

See note 19 supra.
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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to fair notice is even more critical when the statute is precise on its
face. A statute that is void for vagueness at least gives a potential
defendant some notice that there may be a question as to the statute's coverage; precise statutory language, on the other hand,
lulls the potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving
him no reason even to suspect that conduct clearly outside the
scope of the statute as written will be retroactively brought within
it by an act of judicial construction."
Such a judicial enlargement of a statute, according to Boule, operates in the same manner as an ex post facto law, thereby denying a
defendant due process of law.
The application of the Harriss test suggests that the defendants
in Hickman were not adequately forewarned of the proscribed conduct. In fact, since the felony murder and accountability statutes
appear clear on their face that a felon or his accomplice are not
responsible for the lethal acts of nonfelons, the Hickman interpretation may have violated the special prohibition set forth in Bouie
against judicial enlargement of precise statutory language. The
Hickman decision may adequately inform those committing forcible
felonies in the future of the possible penalty if a resister kills a
nonfelon. However, the same due process consideration of lack of
fair notice will again arise if a felon's resister kills one of his cofelons,
since neither the Hickman court nor the felony murder statute ad74
dress that issue.
73. Id. at 352.
74. The argument may also be made that the defendants in Hickman were denied equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the defendants urged that the
Illinois Supreme Court's opinion ... discriminates against these petitioners in that
they are convicted by reason of acts of persons not in any way connected with or
confederating with them, while all other defendants have their own actions as the
basis for criminal responsibility. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 6, Hickman v.
Illinois, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
While the equal protection clause does not prohibit reasonable classifications, Puget Sound
Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934), it does require that all within a class be
treated equally. Yet the defendants in Hickman are the only group of criminals in Illinois
who are held accountable for the acts of other persons even when their conduct is not described in section 5-2 of the Criminal Code. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
Some support can be drawn for this argument from Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), which held that a law requiring sterilization of habitual criminals violated the equal
protection clause because it applied to those convicted of larceny, but not of embezzlement,
even though both crimes were similar in nature and punishable in the same manner. Similarly, the defendants in Hickman are treated differently than all other criminal defendants
in Illinois, even those charged with crimes similar in nature and punishable in the same
manner.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

A POLICY ANALYSIS
The extension of the felony murder rule to lethal acts of nonfelons
is appealing on emotional grounds. It is difficult to sympathize with
a person who arms himself and commits a felony which results in
the death of an innocent person. Yet a law that attaches a criminal
sanction to an act, particularly when that sanction involves the
most severe penalty which the state can impose, must be legally as
well as emotionally supportable.
The Hickman court conditions liability upon foreseeability; the
victim's death in that case is a "direct and foreseeable consequence
of defendants' actions." 5 This may represent an even broader causal connection than the proximate cause test of tort law. If tort
principles were applied to the facts of Hickman, the policeman firing the fatal shot could be deemed an intervening agent, relieving
the felon of liability."6 By not considering the intervening cause
theory, the court has actually adopted a "but-for" test: but for the
action of the felon, the victim would not have been killed." Instead
of applying tort rules to criminal law, liability should be limited to
those acts of the felon performed in furtherance of the felony, 8 confining the scope of the felony murder rule to the lethal acts of the
felon or cofelon.
If the object of the criminal law is retribution, the Hickman decision will meet with approval, since any harsh result will satisfy the
desire for vengeance. Yet the criminal acts in Hickman-burglary
and criminal damage to property, which resulted in an unintended
homicide-are not as heinous as premeditated murder, a crime
which carries the same penalty. 9 Therefore, if the penalty is to be
justified, it should serve the primary purpose of the felony murder
rule-deterrence of dangerous felonies. But Hickman does not strike
at the harm intended by the criminal. Instead, it punishes a greater
wrong which infrequently results from his acts, even though the
felon neither anticipated nor intended that the homicide would
HICKMAN:

75. 59 II. 2d at 94, 319 N.E.2d at 513.
76. For a discussion of causation in tort law, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, 236-90 (4th ed. 1971).
77. Prosser's statement of the "but-for" rule is: "The defendant's conduct is not a cause
of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." Id. at 239. Thus, the "but-for"
rule is a restrictive rule, limiting the defendant's liability when the test is not met. It is not
meant to be a rule of causation in tort law, let alone in criminal law.
78. LaFave and Scott argue that tort principles should not be applied in criminal law. A
person's liability for his negligent acts is undergoing an expansion in tort law, but this trend
should not be carried into the realm of criminal law, where the consequences of guilt are more
drastic than a payment of money. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at 251-52.
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1973).
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occur.8" Even if one accepts the theory that more severe penalties
serve as a deterrent, the punishment should at least bear some
relationship to the moral culpability of the criminal. This relationship is absent when the felon is held responsible for unintended and
undesired acts committed by a third person. The criminal conduct
is more accurately described by the involuntary manslaughter statute, which prohibits reckless acts that are likely to result in death
or great bodily injury.8 ' The purposes of justice would be better
served by the imposition of a punishment befitting the crime.
Illinois should discard the proximate cause theory as it applies to
criminal law and hold that a felony murder conviction will be sustained only when the person who kills is the felon himself or his
confederate.
MARK M. JoY
80. For a thorough discussion of policy considerations, see Morris, The Felon's Responsibilities for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 66-69 (1956).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3(a) (1973). The involuntary manslaughter statute reads:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary
manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such
as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly. Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, it appears that only the acts of the defendant and his cofelons, for whose actions he is
accountable, may result in conviction unless the proximate cause theory of criminal liability
is used. Still, the involuntary manslaughter conviction is preferable to a murder conviction
if the punishment better matches the moral culpability of the defendant.

